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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

r

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

CASE NO,

CLIFFORD A. PRINCE, dba
PRINCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,

14337

Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We refer to Westernfs points in the sequence used
by it, footnoting references to page numbers of Westernfs brief.
The statement of facts, and later references thereto in the argument of respondent Western, go far beyond
the record in this case and lose sight of the issue to
be decided:

Was Judge Croft in error in ruling that

Western's liability on its bond was subject to a oneyear statute of limitation?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Western discusses a prior federal court action.
There is nothing in the record thereon.
ern's discussion is factual; some is not.

Some of WestFor instance,

Western1s statement that a federal court action was begun "one day after the one-year termination"
neous.

is erro-

In order to refute that statement, we too must

go outside the record and state that the federal court
action was commenced October 30, 1974, whereas the complaint alleged the furnishing of the last material on
October 30, 1973.

There was an amended complaint dated

and filed October 31, but the original complaint had
been filed, and the action had been commenced, the day
before.

The record does not show the reasons Arnold

seeks recovery against the subcontractor and its surety, with whom Arnold dealt, instead of against the contractor and its surety, with whom Arnold had no dealings, or against all.

All are not necessary parties.

The issue, however, is not the merits or demerits of the
federal court action, but whether or not a one-year limitation applies to this action on Western's bond.

1
P. 13
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ARGUMENT
Point I
The Relief Sought on Appeal is Appropriate
Western argues that, because it had sought and obtained dismissal from the case, it should not be bound
by the decision herein adjudicating the amount the subcontractor Prince owed the materialman Arnold.

Western

chose not to remain in the action to litigate the question, and should not now be heard to say it is not bound
by the adjudication.Prince had the incentive to oppose
the motion for summary judgment and did in fact oppose
it.

The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgments against

persons derivatively responsible is applicable in the
3
case of indemnitors.
Western reasons that, because there x\ras an amended
complaint filed after Western was dismissed from the
case, some new issues were brought in,such as a credit
memorandum for offsets due Prince.

The file shows that

the only thing done by the amended complaint was to allege that the amount claimed in the original complaint
had been agreed to by Prince, creating an account stated.
Western would be bound on either theory of liability.

2
P. 10
3
46 Am.Jur.-2d Judgments, par. 551
4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Western asserts that the offsets which Arnold had
recognized were due Prince may have been attributable
to something other than the Fish Lake project on which
c
Western issued the bond.
Western can hardly object
that Prince and it are getting a credit, regardless
of its source.
Western argues that Prince's liability on its
contract with Arnold for attorney's fees incurred by
Arnold to collect for the material furnished could
not be imposed upon Western.

The authorities on
7
such liability of bonding companies are contra.
Point II
The Bond Running to Tolman is for the Benefit
of Tolman and Materialmen
Western argues that the language of the bond is

not broad enough to include anyone but Prince as a
beneficiary, and quotes the language of the bond nam8
ing Tolman as the one to whom Western is bound. The

5
P. 11
6
P. 11
7
Dale Benz, Inc., Contractors, v. American Casualty Co.
(CA9 Ariz) 303 F2d 80.
National Surety Corp. v. U.S. (CA5 Tex) 327 F2d 254,
cert den 379 US 819, 13 L ed 2d 30, 85 S Ct 38.
State ex rel.Grinnell Co. v. E. H. White Co. (Or)
3 5 6 p 2 d 943.
H. Richards
Oil
Co.W. Hunter
v W.LawS.
Luckie,
(Tex
Digitized by
the Howard
Library,
J. Reuben ClarkInc.
Law School,
BYU. Civ App)
Machine-generated
OCR,
may
contain
errors.
391 SW2d 135.

whole contract theory of third-party beneficiary liability is that, whether or not named, the party for
whose benefit a contract is made may claim thereunder.

9

As discussed'under the Statement of Facts, Western assumes that a prior federal court action was
brought one day after the Miller Act one-year limitation had run.

Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental

Casualty Company 219 F.2d 645, quoted extensively hereafter because of its similar fact situation, holds that
the subcontractor's bondsman is liable to the materialman if the Miller Act limitation period has barred a
claim under the Miller Act bond.
The language of the condition of the bond shows
that liability to Arnold exists.
upon three things:

It is conditioned

(1) performance of the contract

by Prince, and (2) indemnification of Tolman by Prince,
and (3) prompt payment of materialmen.

Western

dwells upon the second point, indemnification of Tolman,
and argues that if Tolman is not liable and therefore
does not need indemnification, there can be no liability to anyone under the bond.

That argument ignores

the other two conditions, and particularly the third
condition as to prompt payment of materialmen.

A con-

tractor is not solely interested in indemnification,

9
Deluxe Glass v. Martin 116 U. 144, 208 P.2d 1127,1130
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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n

AT

which is the reason that the other two conditions are
put into the bond.

A contractor is interested not on-

ly in protecting himself from claims of materialmen
but also in having the job completed and paid for so
that the contractor does not become involved in the
time and effort required in settling claims, litigation, attorney's fees, and damage to business reputation, which necessarily flow from a construction job
on which subcontractors go broke.
The fact that the contractor, Tolman, is not a
party to this action, he not being a necessary party,
is no indication that Tolman is disinterested in having the materialmen paid.
Western attempts to distinguish DeLuxe Glass v.
Martin (supra), wherein this court held that, despite
the fact that the bond did not have a provision therein expressly recognizing rights of third party beneficiary materialmen, the third party beneficiary materialman could sue the bonding company.

Western's

attempted distinction is based upon the premise that
in DeLuxe the named beneficiary was liable to the materialmen.

That premise is unfounded.

In DeLuxe

11
P. 17
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the court held that the named beneficiary-owner had
complied with the bonding statute and therefore was
not liable to-the materialmen.

It, nevertheless,

held that the materialmen, even though not named as
beneficiaries, had a direct right of action under the
bond.

Western quotes the following language:
It follows that should the owner be required to pay the debts in question, the
surety would be liable under the bond to
the owner in precisely the amount which it
is, by judgment below, required to pay the
creditors.

Taken in context, this was the alternative holding by
the court, that i^f the bond had been held to be inadequate under the bonding statute, and "viewing the bond
as a common-law obligation/' the owner-beneficiary was
liable to the materialmen for not having furnished the
statutory bond, and the bonding company would nevertheless be liable.

In other words, the court in DeLuxe

was not basing its ruling, that an unnamed third party
beneficiary of a bond could sue, on any such premise
that such right is dependent upon the liability of the
beneficiary to the materialmen.
Western further argues as a point of distinction
that "Tolman has no claim against Prince or the Western
12
Surety Company."
Western does not explain why the
named beneficiary, Tolnan, could not successfully claim

12
P. 17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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not only under the subcontract with Prince, but also
under the bond furnished, wherein Prince was the principal and Western was the surety, that the materialman Arnold must be paid as agreed to under the contract and bond.
In Utah State Building Board v. Walsh Plumbing
Co. 16 U.2d 249, 399 P.2d 141 the opposite contention
was being made, that only the unnamed third-party
beneficiary materialmen could sue and that, if they
had not claimed in time, the named beneficiary could
not sue.

This court rejected that contention.

In

doing so, it recognized that materialmen could sue
even though not named in the bond, but that they were
not the only ones protected.

The court also recog-

nized that the bond was given not only "to carry out
the overall objective of construction and delivering
a debt-free building," but also to protect materialmen.
We conclude, from the above, that Arnold, although not named in the bond, is one of the beneficiaries thereof.
Point III
Plaintiff's Sole Remedy is Not in the Federal Court
The ruling of Judge Croft was partially correct,
wherein he determined that the remedy under the federal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Miller Act was not an exclusive remedy.
Under this point, Western continues to argue, and
cite authority to the effect that, if Tolman is liable
to Prince's materialman, Prince and his surety, West14
ern, would be liable to Tolman.
omatic, and we agree.

That is almost axi-

The converse, however, is not

true, nor is any authority cited, that Western's liability to Arnold is dependent upon TolmanTs being liable.

As analyzed above, DeLuxe expressly holds to the

contrary, that the bonding company was liable to the
materialman even though the named beneficiary was not
liable to the materialman.
Arnold has chosen to claim against the bonding
company of the subcontractor with whom it dealt, rather than against the bonding company of the contractor
with whom it had no dealings.

Another bonding com-

pany's having also agreed to pay materialmen should
be no defense to Western.

The beneficiary of two sepa-

rate agreements to make the same payment should be able
to sue either or both of the promisors.
Western cites the New York case of McGrath v.
American Surety Co. of New York 122 N.E.2d 906, and

13
R. 73-75
14
Pp. 18-22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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quotes therefrom, extensively, language wherein the
court was attempting to determine what the "intention
of the parties" was in issuing and obtaining a subcontractors' bond.15

The New York court found, as a mat-

ter of fact, that the intention of the contracting
parties was solely to protect the prime contractor
from liability under the Miller Act, and ruled that
the subcontractor's bondsman therefor was not liable
to a materialman.
The reasoning of this case was severely criticized in Socony-Vacuum Oil v. Continental Casualty Co.
219 F.2d 645, 647, 648, 649.

There, in a similar

fact situation, the Second Circuit refused to follow
McGrath.

The court said:

(2) Professor Corbin in his work on law of
contracts, 4 Corbin on Contracts, Sections 798804, has this to say: "* * the third party has
an enforcible right if the surety promises in
the bond, either in express words or by reasonable implication, to pay money to him. If there
is such a promissory expression as this, there
need be no discussion o£ ' intention to benefit'•
We need not speculate for whose benefit the contract was made, or wonder whether the promisee
was buying the promise for his own selfish interest or for philanthropic purposes. It is a
much simpler question: Did the surety promise
to pay money to the plaintiff?" See also Corbin, "Contractor's Surety Bonds," 38 Yale Law
Journal 1. This doctrine, we think, has the support of the great weight of authority. A long
line of cases cited to such doctrine in 77 A.L.R.
53 amplifies the cases which Professor Corbin

15
P. 19

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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particularly cites.
We are unable to recognize either the validity or the relevance of the conclusion of the
trial judge that the bond was given only for
the benefit of the prime contractor and not for
the protection of materialmen. Doubtless the
prime contractor in requiring a bond of its
subcontractor sought protection against his own
liability to materialmen of the subcontractor.
But this he obtained through a bond requiring
the payment of the materialmen. Obviously it
was contemplated that performance under the
bond would benefit not only the prime contractor who would thereby be exonerated from liability to the materialmen thus paid but also
the materialmen of the subcontractor who were
thereby to be paid.
(3) But this aside, we think it was wholly
irrelevant for the trial judge to speculate as
to the motives of the parties of the bond. The
scope of the bond, like any written contract,
must be determined not by the unexpressed motive of the parties but rather by the ordinary
meaning of the words which they used. By this
simple test, the defendant here was plainly
obligated to pay nmaterial obligations" such
as that sued on here.
The situation is affected not at all by the
fact that the plaintiff failed to perfect its
rights under the Miller Act against the prime
contractor and its surety. The bond now sought
to reach was not one required under that Act
and the rights to which it gave rise are not
qualified by the Act or conditioned upon the
timely pursuit of remedies under that Act. The
rights under this bond must be determined by
its language interpreted as of the date it was
given. At that time, of course, it was not
known whether all or some of the materialmen
would fail or decline to press their rights under the Miller Act.
Moreover, the bond was conditioned not only on the
payment of T?material obligations" but also on reimoursement to the obligee of "all loss and damage
which said obligee may sustain by reason of failure
or default on the part of said Principal." This
latter branch of the condition was broad enough to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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protect the prime contractor against claims
of materialmen which through timely prosecution had actually caused loss to the prime
contractor or his surety. The branch of the
condition calling for payment of material
obligations without limitation to those which
might be timely prosecuted under the Miller
Act imports an intent that all were to be included within the obligation of the bond.
.••But both the Spokane and the McGrath
cases and others of similar purport we think
out of line with the great weight of authority referred to above. With deference, we suggest that it is unfortunate doctrine to modify the scope of a plainly stated written obligation in a private bond by the supposed motive of the obligee, as these cases seem to
do. Such doctrine leads to unnecessary and
undesirable uncertainty in business relationships. It means that one within the orbit of
a private bond cannot rely upon a plainly
stated obligation; instead he must search
for the undisclosed motive of the parties and
take that as the measure of his rights,
...To say that the object of the bond was
only to protect the obligee against liabilities imposed upon him by the Miller Act overlooks the fact that the bond was not required
by that Act and calls for the payment of "all
labor and material obligations'" without express limitation to liabilities of the obligee
under the Miller Act. In our view, the object
of the bond was to accomplish the payment of
these obligations and by such payment to provide protection to the obligee. If the obligee sought indemnity only or if it wished to
exclude third parties from benefit under a surety bond, the natural presumption is that it would
not have required a surety's payment bond. But
here the prime contractor required a payment
bond and paid the premium for a payment bond,
at least indirectly under the terms of the subcontract whereby the subcontractor made the direct payment. And the defendant in return for
the premium, furnished a payment bond. It follows that the surety should not be allowed to
avoid the obligation which it was paid to assume
by suggesting that as things turned out the obligee did not need all the protection which was
bargained and paid for. Were we to hold otherwise, we should in effect, by substituting a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mere contract for indemnity for the bond which
was made, be presenting the defendant surety
company with an unearned windfall.
This court" in DeLuxe (supra) has shown that it would
follow Socony instead of McGrath.

In DeLuxe this court

said that it would recognize the right of a materialman
to recover from the bonding company regardless of the
M

intentM of the contracting parties:
"It is not always quite clear what is meant
when the courts say that the Tintention' of
the parties is controlling. There does not seem
to be any basis for holding that, although a performance of the contract will necessarily and
directly benefit the third person, his remedy depends upon an intention on the part of the parties to the contract that he shall have the right
to sue thereon. While the intention of the parties controls in the creation of rights under the
contract, and in determining the things required
by the contract to be done by the parties, it
would seem that, once the right is created or
the duty is imposed in favor of the third person,
the law furnishes the remedy, regardless of the
intention of the parties in respect thereof.
rf

* * * So long as the contract necessarily and
directly benefits the third person, it is immaterial that this protection was afforded him, not as
an end in itself, but for the sole purpose of securing to the promisee some consequent benefit or
immunity. In short, the motive, purpose, or desire of the parties is a quite different thing
from their intention. The former is immaterial;
the intention, as disclosed by the terms of the
contract, governs. It is to be borne in mind that
the parties are presumed to intend the consequences
of a performance of the contract. That which is
contemplated by the terms of the contract is fintended1 by the parties. fThe distinction between
the motive which leads a person to enter into a
contract, and the intention deducible from the
terms of the contract as it is written, is a very
clear one.T * * *" (Citing cases).
(5) Clearly, the bond in this case was "intended" to directly benefit the materialmen, as that
expression is above defined. They, therefore, are
entitled to maintain this action.
i &
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Consequently, Arnold's sole remedy is not to bring
an action in the federal court under the Miller Act.
Point IV
One-Year Limitation is Inapplicable
Western argues that Arnold "... takes the position
that we here have a bond which is not a bond...and that
none of the many bond limitations... are of any weight."
That is not Arnold's position.

The position is, rather,

that none of the particular statutory provisions as to
particular bonds, relied on by Judge Croft and Western,
applies to the common-law bond.
Western attempts to distinguish Rader v. Manufacturer's Casualty Insurance Co, of Philadelphia 242 F.2d
-19, on the ground that the particular bond involved
18
xas not a "payment bond."
We recognize that there is
such a distinction, but feel it is a distinction without a difference.

The point the case establishes is

that, if the bond is not of the type required by a particular statute, a statute of limitations relating to
commencement of suit under such bond is inapplicable to
a collateral bond issued in the same transaction, but
r.ot of the type required^y the statute.

?. 25
?. 23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.
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Western argues that Utah decisions recognize the
similarity between the mechanics1 lien and bond
statutes and decisions.19 With this we have no quarrel.
However, the statutes are not identical and there are
different requirements for various things including the
following:

A lien claimant must file within 60 to 80

days after completion of contract under 38-1-7, whereas no time is provided for filing a claim under a bond
required by 14-2-1; a lien claimant must sue within 12
months after completion of contract under 38-1-11, whereas one claiming for failing to furnish a bond must sue
within one year from furnishing last material, 14-2-2.
.The assumption of Western, therefore, that the lien
and bond statutes are interchangeable cannot be sustained despite the language contained in Carlisle v,
20
Cox
recognizing their similarity.
Western argues that "all bond statutes contain the
21
imposition of one-year statutes of limitations."
We
concede that the ones cited by Western contain a oneyear limitation, but each one cited refers to a particular type of bond and none of them purports to cover

19
Pp. 15, 24
20
29 U,2d 136, 506 P.2d 60
21
P. 24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1 r

"common -law" bonds.

This court recognized in DeLuxe

'supra) that there can be, and are, common-law bonds
in stating:
Disregarding the quoted statute and viewing
the bond as a common law obligation, the
weight of authority is to the effect that
under the bond here involved, the circuity
suggested by what is said in the preceding
paragraph is not here required; and that
under such bond the plaintiff and interveners may sue the surety.22
The rationale used by the court in its decision in
Deluxe was to consider the bond, there in question,
first from the point of view of its being a commonlav; bond and second from the point of view of its
being a bond required by statute, and reaching the
sar.e result from both approaches.
Western quotes 14-2-2 as providing:
"actions to recover on liabilities shall be
commenced within one year from the last date
that the materials were furnished or the labor performed." (emphasis added) 23
This is a misquote, which undoubtedly was unintentional, but it nevertheless reflects the mistaken rationale used by Western.

The correct quote of the statute

"actions to recover on such liability shall
be commenced within one year from the last
date that the materials were furnished or
the labor performed." (emphasis added)

2.08 P.2d 1127, 1131
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The correct quote shows that this one-year limitation
is referring to f,such liabilityn as referred to in the
chapter.
Western argues that Oscar E. Chytraus Company,Inc.
24
v. Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc.

applies the one-

year limitation in 14-2-2 to a situation in which there
was an action on the bond, as distinguished from an action for failure to require a bond.

We concede that

the court did so, but feel that, in so doing, the court
did not consider the distinction we make, that the oneyear limitation by the very terms of the act is applicable to "any persons subject to the provisions of this
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond...n (emphasis added).

Such a distinction

was not discussed in the opinion.

We cannot see how

the statute can be construed as being applicable to a
situation in which a bond was furnished, when the language is otherwise, despite the reasoning in Chytraus.
The principal reason, however, that we argue that the
one-year limitation of 14-2-2 does not apply is that
it relates to a private owner's duty to require the
contractor to furnish a bond, and not to a federal
project contractor's voluntarily obtaining a bond.

24
23 U.2d 338, 502 P.2d 554

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This is further emphasized by the above-quoted language of the Act which limits its applicability to
"any persons subject to the provisions of this chapter.M
Western argues that Arnold is inconsistent in
saying on the one hand "that the situation was not
or.e concerned with federal law... then analysing that
it was not a state project but rather a federal pro25
;ect."
This is a misstatement of our position,
which is that the work was on a federal project and
was not,therefore,the type of project in which a bond
is required of an owner improving his land under a
private contract.
Western argues that "if state laws should apply"
the contractor requiring a bond not required by statute
should be treated as if he were "the owner," who is
required by statute to obtain a bond, pursuant to which
there would be a one-year limitation.
secuitur.

This is a non-

Each particular state statute involved has

to be examined to determine whether or not it applies.
If state law applies, all "state laws" do not. Whether
27
:r not a particular state law "should apply"
must be

? . 27
?. 27
? . 27-28
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determined by the language used by the legislature.
If the legislature intended a limitation of one year
to apply on all bonds, it would have said so.
Western argues that the contractor Tolman's requiring the furnishing of a bond by Prince was a "private contract" which is "analogous and similar to that
28
provided for in Section 14-2-1.ff

Western then con-

cludes therefrom that, since it is similar to a situation in which a bond is required and a limitation
period provided for, the statute should apply.

If

that had been the legislative intent, the legislature
would not have required an "owner of any interest in
land" to furnish a bond but would have said "anyone
entering into a contract,"
Probably the most venerable case ever cited to
any personnel of this court is Victor Sewing Machine
Co. v. Crockwell et al 3 U.152,1 P 470 (1882), judgment affirmed Streeper v. Victor Sewing Machine Co.
112 U.S. 688, 5 S.Ct. 327, 28 L.Ed. 852.

This case

holds that the applicable statute of limitations for
a bond guaranteeing payment is that applicable to an
action on a written instrument, which was then four
years but is now six years.

The case has been cited

with approval and never overruled*
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CONCLUSION
Arnold here seeks recovery from the subcontractor
and its surety, with whom Arnold dealt.

Arnold does

not also seek recovery from the contractor and its surety with whom Arnold had no dealings.
Prince agreed to pay the materialman, Arnold, and
furnished a bond expressly providing that materialmen
would be paid.

Arnold obtained a judgment against

Prince, and now should be able to hold Prince's surety
liable for the very thing it expressly obligated itself
to pay.
Judge Croft was in error in ruling that Arnold's
claim against the surety is barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 14-2-2.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN W. LOWE
BRAYTON, LOWE § HURLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
1011 Walker Bank Building'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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